Last week NSM (20 November( (Norwegian National Security Authority in English) posted that Equinor had suffered a cybersecurity attack NSM deler tiltak mot sårbarhet i Azure API Management – Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet Azure API Management (APIM). An unknown threat actor has been targeting access tokens, secrets, and named values in Azure API Management (APIM). While Microsoft has now patches the initial vulnerabilty, they advise customers to verify their runtime version. The full scope of exploitation remains unclear. Equinor reported an attack on 17 November, which I’ve spent most of last week trying to figure out what happened….
If you run APIM v1, Microsoft has patched the initial vulnerability. Assume anything stored inside APIM has been exposed and rotate your secrets and hunt through your logs to see what happened. The main goal of the attackers was to get access to SPNs, API keys og subscription keys that gave them access to LLMs, since many are using APIM as a gateway for LLMs.
APIM sits in front of your APIs and holds the keys required to reach them. Depending on your architecture, a compromised instance can expose:
- Named values: Plain text, secrets, or Key Vault references used by policies.
- Backend credentials: Client secrets, certificates, and API keys for downstream services.
- Portal & access keys: Subscription keys and identity-provider configurations for the developer portal.
If an attacker extracts these credentials, they can bypass APIM entirely and authenticate directly against the underlying services. The blast radius comes down to what permissions those credentials hold—and whether they are still valid.
Every APIM instance includes a legacy direct Management API endpoint (<instance>.management.azure-api.net). Rather than using Entra ID, it authenticates with a SharedAccessSignature token in the Authorization header, signed using the instance’s tenant access key.
Microsoft retired this API in March 2025 (ergo deprecated) but it was still active. Because the endpoint bypasses Entra ID, ignores Azure RBAC, and leaves no trace in the ARM Activity Log, leaving it active creates a major security blind spot, and note this was even IF! Management API → Enable Management REST API was set to No.
Here is a picture where it tries to provide an overview of what the attackers did.

To verify whether Microsoft has already upgraded your APIM instance, check the Azure Activity Log for a completed scheduled maintenance event. If you forward Activity Logs to Log Analytics, run this across your subscriptions to see which instances have been upgraded and when:
AzureActivity
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where OperationNameValue =~ “MICROSOFT.APIMANAGEMENT/SERVICE/SCHEDULEDMAINTENANCE/ACTION”
| where ActivityStatusValue == “Succeeded”
| extend Props = parse_json(Properties)
| where Props.description == “Upgrading API Management Service”
| project TimeGenerated, SubscriptionId, ResourceGroup, ServiceName = Props.serviceName, CorrelationId
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
If you want more details on what to look for, I recommend that you take a look at my friends blog post which goes into more details on detection methods –> Azure API Management advisory: what to check and how to hunt after recent attacks – Cloud Securityblog
When are you not affected by this attack vector?
This attack vector does not apply if you are using one of the following.
- You use APIM v2 (Basic v2, Standard v2, or Premium v2), where the legacy Management API is not available. The same applies for Consumption tier which was also part of v1. (NOTE: If it says STV 2.1 it is still v1)
- The relevant APIM endpoints are inaccessible from the internet, for example through a supported Private Endpoint or Internal VNet configuration with public access disabled (mostly only available in Premium SKU)
- Direct access to the relevant endpoints is blocked. A WAF or firewall in front of APIM is only sufficient if attackers cannot bypass it and access APIM directly, including through
*.management.azure-api.netand*.data.azure-api.net.
For those that are running classic APIM (v1) with publicly accessible endpoints, I recommend that you..
- Move secrets to Key Vault (from named values)
Replace local Secret Named Values with Key Vault-backed Named Values. Grant APIM’s Managed Identity only the necessary read permissions, and restrict other access to the secrets… - Review Service Principal permissions.
Review and remove unnecessary Authorization Servers configured in APIM. Ensure that associated Service Principals have only the permissions they need in Entra ID, Key Vault, and other relevant services, following the principle of least privilege. - Restrict public exposure and consider migrating to v2...
Use a WAF or firewall to control traffic to your APIs, and block direct access that could bypass this protection. Placing Application Gateway or Front Door in front of APIM is insufficient if the underlying endpoints remain publicly accessible. Consider migrating to APIM v2. - Use private endpoints where supported! (ergo the Key Vaults)
Restrict network access to APIM and connected services, such as Key Vault, Azure OpenAI / Cognitive Services, and backend APIs. Use Private Endpoint and disable public network access where supported. This reduces the risk of stolen credentials being used directly from the internet.
